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OLDER WOMEN AND PENSIONS: 
CATCH 22 
Frances Leonard· 
Pension funds in America represent one of the largest accu-
mulations of capital in the history of the world.1 Private and 
public sector funds exceed $550 billion, and are larger than the 
combined GNP's of Great Britain and France.a Yet older Ameri-
can women, who comprise two-thirds of the retired population, 
share substantially less of this great national resource by every 
way of measurement. The result is that the poverty rate of these 
women is sixty percent higher than that of men.a Thus, sex dis-
crimination in pensions is a matter of profound concern to older 
women, and of overriding importance to planners concerned 
with the implications of our rapidly aging American population. 
This paper will point out some of the ways that sex discrim-
ination reduces the pension income received by women, and 
what can be done about it. This will include a summary of the 
problems faced by the woman earning her own pension check, 88 
well as those faced by the woman dependent upon the retire-
ment or survivor's benefit of another. 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
• Ms. Leonard is a practicing attorney in San Francisco, CA and legal counsel for 
the Older Women's League Educational Fund (OWLEF). This paper was originally pre-
pared for OWLEF (3800 Harrison St., Oakland, CA 94611) as Gray Paper No.4; Issues 
for Action and is reprinted with their permission. 
1. The pension funds are serious money, and are being taken seriously by the 
financial world. Funds now own 20% of all public and privately financed securities in the 
nation. Because unions and employers turn over control of the funds to banks or insur-
ance companies, 25 institutional giants now control over one third of all public and pri-
vate funds. The significance of this immense concentration of power is that economic 
and social policy is heavily influenced by the investments made by these giants. ~ & 
Barber, American Workers Own $550 Billion, in RETmEMENT INCOME: A REPORT FROM 
THE PENSION RIGHTS CENTER (1979) (available from Pension Rights Center, Rm. 1019, 
1346 Conn. Av. N.W. Washington, D.C. 20036) [hereinafter cited as lbmREMENT 
INCOME). 
2. [d. See also Raskin, Pension Funds Could Be the Unions' Secret Weapon, FOR-
TUNE MAGAZINE, Dec. 31, 1979, 64, 64-67. 
3. SUBCOMM. ON RETIREMENT INCOME AND EMPLOYMENT, SELECT COMM. ON AGING, 
96TH CONG., 1ST SESS., WOMEN AND RETmEMENT INCOME PROGRAMS: CURRENT IssUES OF 
EQUITY AND ADEQUACY 9 (Comm. Print 1979)(prepared by Cong. Research Serv., Library 
of Cong.) [hereinafter cited as eRS REPORT). 
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The pensio)[l "universe" of thousands of plans can be loosely 
divided into those provided by public sector employment and 
private sector employment." Public pensions are generally better 
than private pensions, and almost all public employees are work-
ing under covered employment, while only one-half of the em-
ployees in the lprivate sector are working in jobs covered by a 
pension plan. G Of course, plans vary in their provisions and 
terms; however, the enactment in 1974 of minimum federal stan-
dards for private pension plans (ERISA) makes it possible to 
discuss the plans as a group. 
When a woman reaches retirement age, her income will 
most likely not include a pension. Roughly one out of six women 
over sixty-five reported to the Census Bureau that she received a 
pension. And those pensions they do get are on the average 
lower than mens': $5,582 to $7,566.6 This is because pension 
plans reward th,e long term, steady worker with low mobility and 
high earnings. To the extent a worker's employment pattern 
deviates from this, the worker becomes a "loser" in the "pension 
game":: Further, pension plans are computed on insurance prin-
ciples. The cost of the plan will decrease as the number of for-
feitures increas'e. Therefore, it is well for women and lower paid 
men to recognize that to the extent they are set up to be the 
losers under various programs, they are directly and deliberately 
being made to subsidize the "winners", and there is nothing in-
advertent or innocent about it. 
Furthermore, cost of living increases are a rarity in private 
sector pensions, and not universal in the public sector. This pro-
duces the well-known phenomenon of the inflation-devastated 
pensioner on a fixed income, where a ten percent rate of infla-
tion halves real income in seven years. Sadly, even inflation dis-
4. Social Security will only be mentioned in passing in this paper because sex dis-
crimination in Social Security is treated elsewhere. See, e.g., OWLEF, Gray Paper No.2: 
Issues for Action, Social Security: Adequacy and Equity for Older Women (1979). 
5. Rich, Pensions: Too Few, Too Small for Most, in RETIREMENT INCOME, supra note 
I, at 1, 16. 
6. BUREAU OF CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, No. 118, CURRENT POPULATION RE-
PORT (1977). 
7. For an excellent study of "winners" and "losers" in this most important game, see 
TASK FORCE ON SEX DISCRIMINATION, CIVIL RIGHTS DIY., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE PEN· 
SION GAME: AMERICAN PENSION SYSTEM FROM THE VIEWPOINT OF THE AVERAGE WOMAN 
(1979). 
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criminates by sex due to women's greater longevity. One won-
ders if tolerance of the fixed retirement income is rooted in the 
lower male life expectancy. Cost of living indexing should be rec-
ognized as an issue of major importance to oJder women. 
The impact of pension discrimination follows the woman in 
her various roles. The very person most expected to require in-
come in old age (because of longevity) is handed a pension ob-
stacle course of ominous dimensions. What follows, then, is a re-
view of the pension reducing factors lurking in almost every 
choice a woman can make-from homemaker to high paid 
worker; from lifetime marriage to divorce. 
I. THE HOMEMAKER 
Homemakers comprise the largest group of workers in the 
country. Unlike some other nations (i.e., Canada, France, Ger-
many, England and Sweden), the United States does not con-
sider homemaking a pensionable activity. Here, pensions are 
based on revenue-generating occupations, and homemaking is 
not given recognition as such. 
Two approaches develop when discussions of mitigating the 
impoverished old age of career homemakers arise. The first ap-
. proach is tied to dependency, the prevailing pattern of the tradi-
tional homemaker role. Under this tack, a wage earner's benefits 
are increased in recognition of the dollar value of the home-
maker's efforts to the employer's enterprise. But note that to 
benefit under this type of solution, the homemaker must still be 
married to the wage earner upon his retirement. 
The better approach would abolish the concept of depen-
dency and develop pension plans that vest in the homemaker's 
own right. In addition to the basic fairness and dignity of this 
approach, it obviously is expedient in this age of frequent di-
vorce for the worker in the home to protect her retirement years 
independently of her spouse's benefits. 
Discussion in depth of various proposals is beyond the scope 
of this paper. Briefly, they include splitting income credits for 
Social Security, establishing separate retirement credits with the 
employed spouse's employer, direct federal pensions for home-
makers, and homemakers' Individual Retirement Accounts 
3
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(IRA's) not tied to their spouse's IRA-'s. 
The last proposal would be logistically- the easiest to imple-
ment. Under a tax-sheltered IRA, a homemaker could achieve a 
retirement income double the yield of an ordinary savings pro-
gram. Homemakers argue that they file joint tax returns, so 
should qualify for joint tax credits. Homemaker's IRA's are at-
tacked by those who feel they would subsidize wealthier fami-
lies, who can afford a stay-at-home spouse and reap the tax ben-
efits. This argument ~hould be strongly countered by women 
who well know tlb.e hard work they do in the home. 
In addition to receiving no pension credits for work done in 
the home, the homemaker who was employed before leaving to 
raise a family is devastated by current methods of computing 
Social Security benefits. She may have paid the highest contri-
butions for the full vesting period, but when her turn comes to 
draw benefits, she will draw a minimal amount. This is because 
her "zero income" years will be included in the computation. 
Great Britain and Quebec have recently reformed their pro-
grams to rectify this inequity.8 
. . 
Whether or not Americans should continue to restrict re-
t~ement benefits to revenue producing work is a major policy 
qu~stion. If it is agreed that homemakers provide a service to 
the nation of incalculable value, then it is imperative that 
policymakers eljminate the disincentives to that role-including 
pension disqualifications that penalize or preclude combining 
paid work with home work, and retirement income concepts that 
utterly disregard the years of hard work in the home. 
But if, as a matter of thoughtful consideration, our society 
determines to reject the role of homemaker and child-rearer as a 
worthwhile vocation and suitable for adults, then let's make the 
judgment emphatically clear to young women from their earliest 
days. Let's educate them for the purpose of fulltime, permanent 
participation in the paid workforce, and discourage homemaking 
or child-rearing as a choice. 
8. Kreitler-Kirkpat;rick, A Comparison of Social Security Provisions Benefiting Wo-
men, 2 AGING AND WORK 269, 270 (1979). 
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II. THE EMPLOYED WOMAN 
Older women have a great interest in the sex discriminatory 
provisions of pension plans, which serve to reduce their retire-
ment income. Congress in 1974 passed major legislation regulat-
ing private pension plans (ERISA}-but chose not to make it 
mandatory for a private employer to offer a plan at all. Because 
most people over sixty-five are women, mandatory pensio~8 are 
an issue of first importance to older women. Service industries 
and small employers are the least likely to have plans. Because 
employment discrimination forces women workers into these 
very areas, fewer than half as many women as men (twenty-one 
percent of women to forty-nine percent of men) working in the 
private sector are working in covered employment.s 
Further, of those women working in covered employment, 
very few will ever qualify for a pension check. This is because of 
several provisions common to most plans, both public and pri-
vate, that weigh against work patterns typical of women. 
A. ERISA STANDARDS 
The Employees Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) 
was enacted by Congress in 1974 to establish minimum stan-
dards for private pension plans. Although a much-needed reform 
act, unfortunately women are disproportionately disadvantaged 
by almost every qualification. This is because ERISA did little 
more than codify minimal standards which plans must meet, 
based on traditional pension "values". Historically, in this coun-
try these values'reward the long-term, steady, well-paid worker, 
and are reflected in pension plans in these ways: 
Age exclusions. ERISA permits employers to exclude from 
coverage people under twenty-five years of age, and, under most 
plans, those persons hired within five years of the normal retire-
ment age set by the plan. These age exclusions work to "disqual-
ify large numbers of women from participating in a plan, be-
cause age twenty to twenty-four represents the highest 
proportion of women in the workplace. In 1978, over sixty-eight 
percent of women aged twenty to twenty-four were employed; it 
9. CRS REPORT, supra note 3, at 3. 
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is projected that this will exceed seventy-six percent by 1985.10 
After age twenty-five, women's participation sharply drops off as 
women leave to assume family responsibilities. Similarly, an 
older woman entering the workplace because the divorce or 
death of spouse caused her to do so quite late in life would be 
excluded. Thus the age exclusions at both ends of her life penal-
ize a woman for her middle years of family commitment-a dis-
qualification that falls upon very few men. 
Vesting. A person must work long enough for one employer, 
or forfeit the pension rights accrued. This is known as the "vest-
ing" requirement. Most plans under ERISA require ten years of 
employment before vesting occurs. ERISA's tolerance of the ten 
year period eliminates from private pension eligibility most of 
the women workers who choose to leave the workforce to raise 
families. 11 
Part-time exclusion. Many women do manage to be "long-
term employees" by working part-time while caring for their 
families. This predominantly female employment pattern 
(thirty-three percent of women to twelve percent of men)12 also 
fails to qualify under most private plans. ERISA permits em- • 
ployers to exclude persons who work less than one thousand 
hours per year, or nineteen hours per week. The effect of this is 
to remove yet another large group of employed women from the 
"pension game." 
Break-in-service. Although ten years may be required for 
vesting, the plan must permit workers who leave and return, the 
opportunity to vest. But if the "break-in-service" equ8ls or ex-
ceeds the last period of employment, the worker forfeits all prior 
credits toward vesting. A woman who leaves her job to have chil-
dren, and then returns to her old job may have to start her vest-
ing period anew. So yet another method of combining work and 
family has the effect of removing women from the pool of future 
10. rd. at 41-42 •• 
11. On the average, men stay on one job 4.5 years, and women about two years. A 
Special News Report on People and their Jobs in Offices, Fields and Factories, Wall st. 
J., May I, 1979, at 1, col. 5. Lobbyists on behalf of occupations with inherently high 
mobility, such as engineers, are energetically campaigning to lower the ERISA vesting 
period. 
12. CRS· Report, supra note 3, at 42. 
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pension beneficiaries. 
Backloading. The practice known as "backloading" allows a 
plan to increase retirement credit in later years of employment. 
This rewards the worker who spends a long working life in one 
place. It condemns the worker not fitted to that employment 
pattern to a lower retirement check. And once aga41, the re-
warded work pattern is mostly that of males. 
Portability. If workers could take pension credits "with 
them" when they change jobs, as is done under Social Security, 
mobile women workers would benefit greatly. But the logistics of 
accomplishing this in the private sector are enormous. 
Pension fund insurance. It is clear that any woman wishing 
to devote full or part time care to the home will be virtually 
eliminated from the pool of pension beneficiaries. But for many 
women who do conform to the male work-pattern, there is a 
nasty surprise. When ERISA was enacted, Congress set up a 
pension fund insurance program, along the same idea as the fed-
eral deposit insurance for private bank accounts. Yet a major 
exemption from protection under the insurance is the worker in 
the small professional office. The nurse, legal secretary or book-
keeper may achieve a vested status, yet find their fund failed at 
the end. They will be uninsured and out of luck.13 
B. INTEGRATION AND OFF-SET 
Integration. The working woman' faces another pension re-
ducing measure because of the likelihood of her being among the 
lowest paid workers. Integration means that the private plan is 
"integrated" with the Social Security benefit. It is especially vi-
cious to lower paid workers. For example, a plan would be per-
mitted to define its pension benefit when combined with Social 
Security as amounting to fifty-five percent of the worker's last 
wage. A lower paid worker may find that her Social Security 
check is fifty-five percent of her last wage. Her pension check 
would be zero. Thus, any worker earning less than the Social 
Security wage base can end up with no pension check, under ex-
13. Fitzgerald, The Pension Stakes: What it Tokes to Win, in RImREMENT INCOME, 
supra note I, at 20. 
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isting regulations.H It is estimated that twenty-five percent of 
workers under a plan are now "integrated out" of a benefit. III 
And because women's wages average sixty percent of men's for 
the same work, those integrated out are disproportionately fe-
male.1S Note that these are vested workers-the seeming "win-
ners" of the game-the long distance runners who believe until 
the day they retire that they will have a pension plus Social 
Security! 
Off-set. In an "off-set", it is· Social Security which reduces 
its benefits. Any recipient of a public pension must reduce, dol-
lar for dollar, any benefit received as a dependent on Social Se-
curity. Because most people entitled to the dependent's 
(spousal) benefit are women, this has disproportionately reduced 
the retirement income of women. Teachers, government clerks 
and the rest of the large body of women working in lower paid 
government jobs are affected by this off-set. 
Private plans are growing fast in the retirement picture. 
The loopholes which work against the employed woman must be 
plugged. Because two-thirds of the retired population is female, 
this issue is one that all social planners should address as our 
population contilllues to age. The above-described difficulties are 
examples of so-called "sex-neutral" provisions in the law that 
have a discriminatory "impact" on women. This means that al-
though the ERISA regulations just described apply to both men 
and women, they weigh more heavily on women because of pre-
dominant work patterns, and not because the enactment itself 
uses discriminatory language. Since recent Supreme Court deci-
sions tolerate this type of sex discrimination, perhaps older wo-
men's advocates should concentrate their efforts on legislative 
reform rather than constitutional litigation. A further point for 
employed women to consider is that ERISA standards are mini-
14. By 1981 the Social Security wage base will be $29,000. The Congressional Re-
search Service estimated that in 1974, 60% of all private plans were integrated. CRS 
Report, supra note 3, at 50. The percentage has greatly increased since then, because 
employers favor those plans. Louis Harris Assoc., 1979 Study of American Attitutes To-
ward Pensions and Retirement: A Nationwide Survey of Employees, Retirees, and Busi-
ness Leaders (public opinion poll) [hereinafter cited as Harris Poll]. 
15. Blumenthal, Lower Paid Workers Losing Pensions, in RlmREMENT INCOME, 
supra note I, at 6. 
16. CRS REPORT, supra note 3, at 50. 
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mums. Any pension plan is free to exceed the standards. A plan 
can, if it chooses, vest in one year, fully cover part-time workers, 
exclude no age group, and so forth. Therefore, the quickest way 
for employed women to benefit themselves is at the bargaining 
table at negotiating time. 
C. SEX-BASED ACTUARIAL TABLES 
Unlike the "sex-neutral" problems noted above, an explicit 
sex-based classification can be unlawful. A recent Supreme 
Court decision has been helpful to some employed women. In 
City of Los Angeles v. Manhart. the Court decreed that sex-
, based actuarial tables violate Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 
when they are used to increase the pension contribution taken 
from the paycheck.I? The Court expressly did not decide that 
use of sex-based actuarial tables to reduce a pension when re-
ceived was prohibited by law. Because the majority of private 
plans do not require employee contributions, the apparent vic-
tory is somewhat hollow. 
The use of sex-based actuarial tables to reduce women's 
pensions when received is pervasive. This is justified by insurers 
on the basis of women's greater longevity.I8 Group in~urance, 
which is what a pension fund is, always factors in the unequal 
risks in any group. The high risk participants are always "subsi-
dized" by the low risk ones. Actuaries have identified dozens of 
risk factors related to longevity-among them race, marital s~­
tus and smoking habits. Yet only the gender difference is used 
by the pension actuaries. It should be noted that' the insurance 
industry actively opposes unisex tables because of cost.I9 But de-
cisions which will affect the income of the majority of the retired 
population should be made with other than a market mentality. 
In the meantime, women should avoid annuities whenever they 
have the choice of placement of their funds. For example, in an 
17. 435 U.s. 702 (I977). 
18. TASK FORCE ON SEX DISCRIMINATION, CIVIL RIGHTS DlV., u.s. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, 
COMMENTS TO THE u.s. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS ON THE CONSULTATION ON DISCRIMINA-
TION AGAINST MINoRITIES AND WOMEN IN PENSIONS, AND HEALTH LIFE, AND DISABn.1TY 
INSURANCE 23 (1978) [hereinafter cited as TASK FORCE REPORT]. 
19. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 18, at 23. H. Denenberg, An Overview Report: 
Discrimination in the Insurance Marketplace and in the Insurance Business-With Pri-
mary Emphasis on Life, Health, Disability and Pensions 23 (April 24, 1978) (presenta-
tion to the U.S. Comm'n on Civil Rights). 
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IRA one can purchase a savings plan, bond or an annuity. If an 
annuity is chosen, a woman's dollar will not buy her the same 
monthly check as a man's dollar will. This is not true of dollars 
invested elsewhere. 
III. THE SURVIVOR 
Women should fight the stereotype of dependency, and the 
harmful even disastrous consequences of being utterly depen-
dent upon the income of another. It has often been said that a 
dependent woman is one man away from poverty. But it must 
not be forgotten that the victims of economic dependency are 
very much with us, and with only fifty percent of women em-
ployed today,20 the dependency problem is not going to disap-
pear soon. For this reason, reformers sensitive to the impact of 
pensions on older women should oppose proposals aimed at 
eliminating spousal and survivor's benefits without alternative 
proposals to provide for women who are dependent. For exam-
ple, in response to pressure from single workers, it was recom-
mended that Social Security phase out its spousal and survivor's 
benefits.:n The seeming economic parity in this plan would come 
at the expense of older women-women who have been muscled 
out of the chance of obtaining a pension in their own right by 
the factors already discussed. 
A. THE SPOUSAL BENEFIT 
A woman dependent on her husband's earings will be con-
cerned with two elements of his retirement plan: first, does it 
pay a spousal (or dependent's) benefit while he is alive, and sec-
ond, will there be a survivor's benefit to her after his death? 
At retirement, a couple will receive joint benefits that are 
either more than (under Social Security) or less than (under a 
pension) a single retiree. This difference comes about because of 
divergent pension philosophies. Because of the "adequacy" no-
tion. in the social planning that went into Social Security, a 
couple will receive a joint Social Security benefit that exceeds a 
single retiree's. But strict adherence to insurance principles 
20. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, EMPLOYMENT AND EARNINGS 
155, Table C (1979). 
21. CRS REPORT, supra note 3, at 34-35. 
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leads to the opposite result under employer pension plans. Pen-
sion plans offer a "joint and survivor's" option, which means the 
retiree can elect to take full monthly checks which will end at 
his or her death, or a lower monthly check of which a portion 
will continue to be paid the survivor. The effect of this election 
is to reduce the income of the couple below that of the single 
worker. Recent studies have questioned the legitimacy of the in-
surance principles which bring about this result.22 
Eliminating the practice of reducing the pension check 
when the joint and survivor option is elected would do more 
than increase older women's standard of living derivative upon 
their husband's check. It would greatly reduce the temptation of 
the couple to "take a chance" that she will die first, thus electing 
to take the higher income for the worker's life, with nothing for 
the survivor in the way of benefits. 
B. SURVIVOR'S BENEFITS 
The widow will most likely receive no pension benefits after 
her husband's death. Mandatory survivor's benefits are rare, 
under either governmental or private plans. Moreover, the usual 
practice is to reduce the survivor's check only if the dependent 
is the survivor. If the worker survives, the joint check is not re-
duced at all. This is an issue of some importance to older wo-
men, who wonder at the inequity of considering one half a joint 
·pension adequate for a widow, while a whole joint benefit is con-
tinued for the widower. 
ERISA compels private plans to award a survivor's benefit 
of no less than one-half of the retiree's benefits, unless this op-
tion is rejected in writing by the worker at retirement time. 
Formerly, when a worker retired, he or she was automatically 
awarded a single-life annuity. If a joint-life annuity was availa-
ble at all, it was incumbent on the worker to opt in. Now, under 
ERISA and the big public plans, it is the reverse. But the big 
catch is this: the option is the retiring worker's alone. The 
spouse need never even be informed of the decision, let alone be 
asked to ratify it. More than sixty-four percent of Civil Service 
(federal), thirty-one percent of Foreign Service, and ninety-four 
percent of the Military have opted out of survivor's benefits as 
22. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 18, at 10-11. 
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of February 1979.28 The "opt-out" rate in the private sector can-
not be presumed to be any rosier. 
Obviously, this represents a problem of stunning propor-
tions. For dependents of many retirees, the impact is cushioned 
by the Social Security benefit. But federal Civil Service retirees, 
along with some local government units (i.e., school districts), 
are not covered by Social Security. When these employees opt 
out, they leave their survivors with no pension benefit at all. 
There is legislation pending in the 96th Congress to amend 
ERISA and various federal programs to require the written con-
sent of the dependent before the retiree can opt out.2' These 
reforms are opposed by the insurance industry on the basis of 
the added expense.215 Rather than encumber the plan with this 
small duty, the industry would stand aside as millions of older 
women learn for the first time upon their JlUsband's death, that 
they have been "elected out" of any interest in future pension 
payments. 
Legislative reform requiring the written cons~nt of the de-
pendent before the option is taken is an important first step, but 
does not go far enough. It can be imagined that poorly-informed 
consent, or coercion, or misjudgment, will lead many dependents 
to sign away their rights. Mandatory survivor's benefits should 
be part of every plan; the joint-life annuity should yield as much 
income as the single-life annuity; and the practice of cutting in 
half the survivor's benefit only if the dependent is the survivor 
should be discontinued. 
Another trap for the dependent is this: ERISA allows survi-
vor's benefits to forfeit if the worker dies before retirement. This 
could happen to a fully vested worker, within a year or two of 
retirement age. His widow. will get nothing. ERISA does permit 
23. Fact Sheet on Bills Introduced by Rep. Patricia Schroeder (D., CO.)(1979) (is-
8Ued by Rep. Schroeder's office). 
24. H.R. 2817, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) (Schroeder) (Military Retirement); H.R. 
2857, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979)(Schroeder) (Foreign Service Retirement); H.R. 2878, 
96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) (~chroeder) (Civil Service Retirement); S. 209, 96th Cong., 
1st Seas. (1979) (Williams)(ERISA). 
25. Beshgetoor, Insurance Association Opposes Increased Survivor's Protection, in 
RETumMENT INCOME, supra note I, at 9. 
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a plan to contain a pre-retirement joint and survivor op-
tion-but this will further reduce the already reduced joint and 
survivor annuity-even if the worker survives after retirement. 
The disincentives to this choice are therefore severe. This leaves 
the middle-aged homemaker dangerously unprotected in her 
pre-retirement years. A particularly vicious angle to this "early 
survivor's election is that if this choice is made, and the worker 
dies of natural causes within two years of making the election, 
the benefits are forfeited. This is because a worker who had re-
ceived "bad news" might try to provide for his or her family by 
making this election, thus unsportingly creating, in insurance 
parlance, a "negative selection". Experts say that ailing workers 
have been known to slam their cars into bridge abutments in 
order to provide for their dependents-because accidental 
deaths do not cause a forfeit!28 
Also of importance is what becomes of the survivor's benefit 
if the widow should remarry. Some federal plans such as Social 
Security and some federal retirement plans allow the benefits to 
continue if she remarries after age sixty. Under other federal 
plans and almost all private plans the survivor's benefits forfeit 
upon remarriage at any age. 
The President has commissioned a two-year study on pen-
sion reforms, and included on the agenda is survivor's benefits. 
The Commission on Pensionsl7, must be made aware of the fact 
that most people over sixty-five are women, and because most of 
these women are not entitled to a pension in their own right, the 
issue of survivor's benefits affects more people of retirement age 
than do straight pension rights. . 
IV. THE DIVORCED WOMAN 
There is a growing recognition of the economic partnership 
,of the marital unit among policy-makers. IS The earned compen-
26. Fitzgerald, supra note 13, at 20. 
27. Chaired by C. Peter McColough. Chairperson of Xerox; the commission will pre-
sent its final report to the President in February 1981. 
28. These bills [see note 24 supra) 
are based upon the premise that marriage is an economic part-
nership and the income earned is joint marital property. The 
spouse makes a contribution toward the employee's ability to 
earn the wage and consequently receive the pension. There-
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sation during the course of the marriage is attributable to the 
efforts of the unit, and pension rights are recognized as part of 
the compensation, not a mere gratuity. 
A significant number of women will face divorce after age 
forty-five.~9 The two major assets owned by the couple divorcing 
after a long marriage will most likely be the home and the pen-
sion fund. Yet Social Security alone automatically benefits the 
divorced wife and even then, only after a marriage of ten years.30 
To date, there is no law compelling ERISA plans or public pro-
grams to cover a divorced spouse. 
There are two ways for a divorced woman to share in the 
pension asset. One is by alimony, and the other is by property 
settlement. It is important to note the distinction. Alimony is 
awarded at the discretion of the court, based on the situation at 
hand, and in almost all jurisdictions, is no longer a right. What 
the property rights of the spouses are depends upon the laws of 
their state, and, unfortunately, these laws are far from 
uniform.3t 
A. DEFINING THE MARITAL PROPERTY 
The best legal position for the divorced spouse is the Cali-
fornia recognition that even unvested pension rights are viewed 
as marital property and subject to division upon dissolution.32 
Unfortunately, the California position has been hampered by 
fore, a spouse married during the working years should be en-
titled to a portion of the retirement benefits payable at 
retirement. 
125 Congo Rec. 1069 (daily ed. Mar. 13, 1979) (remarks of Rep. Schroeder). 
29. PENSION RIGHTS CENTER, PENSION FACI'S 2, at 4 (1979). 
30. Further, this is only for divorced women. The exclusion of divorced males has 
been upheld by the Supreme Court. The divorced woman receives 50% of the retiree's 
benefit, as does the current spouse. Like the wife, the divorced woman must await the 
retirement of the worker before her benefits begin. There is legislation pending to de-
crease the required years of marriage. H.R. 874, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979)(Yates). 
31. The Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress found "some 
States do not give divorce courts jurisdiction to divide marital property. Other States use 
a title theory of division. Some States provide for equitable division of the property. Yet 
other States are community property States. Some States consider retirement benefits 
gratuities rather than property. Other States consider retirement benefits to be prop-
erty." CRS REPORT, 3upra note 3, at 77. 
32. In Re Marriage of Brown, 15 Cal. 3d 838, 544 P.2d 941, 126 Cal. Rptr. 633 
(1976). 
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less progressive thinking in Congress and the United States Su-
preme Court. In early 1979, the United States Supreme Court 
disagreed with the California Supreme Court, and held in His-
quierdo v. Hisquierdo33 that Railroad Retirement benefits are 
not community property and therefore are not subject to the 
equal division the California court would have made. The U.S. 
Supreme Court distinguished between alimony and marital 
property rights, and this distinction remains important. 
Originally viewed as a major setback, the Hisquierdo deci-
sion has been applied by the California courts quite narrowly. 
Whether or not certain sections in ERISA would require a simi-
lar determination for private plans has not been decided by the 
U.S. Supreme Court. Courts in California and across the nation 
are reaching different results under similar facts. The rights in-
volved are weighty ones: can a plan be garnished to satisfy mari-
tal property settlement?; can a fund be forced to issue two pen-
sion checks?; are there marital property rights to survivor's 
benefits as well as to retirement benefits?; must a right be vested 
before it is divisible?; can a divorced spouse receive her share 
before the worker retires?; and more. 
Basic rights, such as property interests in a major asset 
(such as the pension fund) should not be unevenly available to 
older women, depending on the part of the country they live in. 
Where a major asset will be available to an older woman upon 
divorce only if she resides in a progressive area of the country, 
the inequities exceed tolerable levels. The courts are chaotically 
engaged in statutory interpretation, and the best place to resolve 
statutory problems is in the legislatures themselves. There is re-
form legislation before Congress now.34 If passed, this will be 
helpful to divorced spouses of federal employees, as they will 
draw automatic retirement and survivor's benefits. The pro-
posed ERISA amendments, however, do not do this for divorced 
spouses of private pension beneficiaries. These amendments will 
33. 439 U.S. 572 (1979). 
34. H.R. 1844, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) (Edwards) (Railroad Retirement); H.R. 
1867, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) (Leach) (Civil Service); H.R. 2472, 96th Cong., 1st 
Sess. (1979) (Whitehurst) (Military Retirement): H.R. 2817, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) 
(Schroeder) (Military Retirement): H.R. 2818, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) (Schroeder) 
(Civil Service): H.R. 2857, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) (Schroeder) (Foreign Service 
Retirement). 
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be very helpful to the divorced residents of progressive states 
where marital pl'Operty rights in the pension fund are recog-
nized. But another solution will have to be found for residents of 
states whose courts are not so inclined. 
Further, the difference between retirement income and sur-
vivor benefits has legal importance. Even California courts do 
not recognize community property interests in survivor's bene-
fits. The bills amending federal retirement programs recognize 
this, and provide for rights in both types of benefits. 
B. DIVIDING THE PENSION 
Another important consideration is the way the pension 
fund will be divided in the property settlement. If there are suf-
ficient assets, it may be preferable to assign a value to the pen-
sion rights, and allocate and award a dollar amount to the 
spouse at the time of dissolution. When this is not possible, the 
court can order either the fund trustees or the retiree to pay 
one-half to the divorced spouse each month at retirement time. 
The former is obviously preferable because it is more certain, 
and has the considerable advantage of not continuing the depen-
dency relationship long after the marriage is over. Fund opera-
tors oppose trustee payment as greatly increasing their over-
head. 
Divorced working women are disadvantaged by the Individ-
ual Retirement (IRA) regulations. Under IRA, persons can put 
aside a portion of their income as tax-deferred savings for retire-
ment. IRA's are a major tax shelter by which workers can shelter 
up to fifteen percent or $1,500 of their income, whichever is 
lower. But alimony income is not counted into the income for 
IRA deductions, even though it is taxed for income tax purposes. 
Thus a worker with alimony and earned income will pay income 
tax on the total but can shelter only the earnings. This reduces 
the amount of taxable income a divorced woman can shelter.35 
The problems facing divorced women are the most complex 
in the pension reform field, and because of conflicting laws, will 
be the most difficult to resolve. This cause will be further bur-
35. H.R. 3250, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) (Kemp) would eliminate this inequity. 
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dened by the opposition of plan trustees, plan participants, and 
wives of retirees. It is here that women must be particularly 
alert to the need for unity. Conflict between older divorced wo-
men and married women must be condemned as defeating the 
recognition of property rights for all women. So too should retir-
ees and former spouses unite over the important issue of divided 
pension payments being paid separately by the plan itself. 
V. EDUCATE, LEGISLATE, LITIGATE AND NEGOTIATE 
A. EDUCATE 
Pension funds control billions of dollars, yet the return on 
investments is scandalously low. Funds are heavily into common 
stocks, and in recent years the top fund investors averaged only 
a one percent return on these equity investments.ss Why on 
earth do the leading financial experts in the country invest so 
poorly? One commentator says: "If the people who contribute to 
pension funds listen and look, they will find their money is being 
used to build economic empires. They will learn they are receiv-
ing very low returns on their investment."S7 The control over 
other corporations gained through the use of the worker's 
money, is then exercised in ways that are often against the inter-
ests of the worker.s8 Workers are urged to insist on having a say 
in the placement of their funds. Bankers, of course, vigorously 
oppose this. 
The point for older women is this: now, at the very begin-
ning of the "social investment" debate, women must make their 
interests known. Pension activists must watch out for occasions 
where this is debated, and ensure that women's issues are on the 
agenda. Women working in large companies or unions must 
come to recognize their unified clout. Their collective voice could 
cause their plan's funds to be placed constructively, and if the 
36. Sen. H. Metzenbaum, Workers Should Demand Pension Fund Control, in RE-
TIREMENT INCOME, supra note 1, at 10. 
37. [d. In his article urging workers to wake up to the situation, Sen. Metzenbaum 
referred to one fund manager which owned a controlling interest in 143 major 
corporations. 
38. "We can no longer tolerate this situation of using worker-produced capital 
against ourselves." Raskin, supra note 2, at 66 (quoting Lloyd McBride, President of the 
U.S. Steelworkers of America). "We shall be pursuing every available means to ensure 
that pension money is invested creatively and constructively, to the benefit of workers 
and fair employers." [d. at 64 (quoting Lane Kirkland, President, AFL·CIO). 
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fund holds controlling power in other corporations, use it to up-
grade the pensions there. 
It is discouraging that a major pension survey commissioned 
by the insurance giant Johnson & Higgins, and conducted by 
Louis Harris, Assoc., practically ignored pension issues that af-
fect older women.39 Out of 137 principal questions, not one ex-
plored survivors', dependents' or divorced persons' benefits. Sur-
vivors' benefits came up only three of four times in subparts of 
questions. Further, this study was regarded as major and exten-
sive, and is being heavily used by policy makers. Yet those sur-
veyed included only employers and employees. Persons depen-
dent on survivors or spousal benefits were not included in the 
sample, even though this group is numerically the largest seg-
ment of retired Americans. 
B. LEGISLATE 
There are close to 100 bills before the 96th Congress which 
are designed to improve pensions for women. The key to their 
passage rests in pressure upon members of Congress to support 
them. One member, Rep. Patricia Schroeder (D. Colo), a pension 
reform advocate, reported recently that the outlook for most of 
them is unfavorable. The importance of pressure groups is illus-
trated by the progress of two of her bills: one, (H.R. 2857) which 
is moving, has 8lIl active group working for it-Foreign Service 
wives. One which is not, (H.R. 2817) has an active group working 
against it-Military husbands. 
Older women cannot wait for Congress to do what is right. 
Pensions, both public and private, are especially subject to legis-
lative reform because the statutory frameworks are already en-
acted. Letter writing, testifying, and supporting helpful amend-
ments should be very useful. 
C. LITIGATE 
A good place for individual litigation is in marital property 
settlements. If a state has a harsh rule on pension rights, and 
does not recognize the fund as divisible marital property, then 
creative alimony settlements should be considered. For example, 
39. Harris .Poll, supra note 14. 
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perhaps an annuity could be purchased as part of alimony, as 
distinct from property, which would yield an income upon ma-
turity equal to the denied pension benefit. 
On a broader base, pension reform litigators should look to 
the federal enactments (Equal Pay Act, Title VII, Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Act, and even the Constitution) for assis-
tance. State law varies widely, but in progressive jurisdictions 
the federal statutes may be supplemented or surpassed. 
D. NEGOTIATE 
Women employees should get on the agenda at contract ne-
gotiation time. Unions should be educated to the requirements 
of their women members, and make these the "bottom line" at 
the bargaining table. It is important to remember that the ER-
ISA (dis)qualifications outlined in this paper are minimum stan-
dards under federal law. A plan cannot, for example, require a 
vesting period of fifteen years, a minimum coverage age of 
thirty, or a "part-time" definition of thirty hours work per week. 
On the other hand, it can provide a one-year vesting period, no 
minimum age, ~d cover all part-time employees, regardless of 
hours worked. 
In addition to insisting on a good pension plan at bargaining 
time, ifis appropriate for prospective employees to question the 
personnel officer about the plan in force. If a job is turned down 
because of unsatisfactory coverage (especially appropriate in the 
case of a permanent "part-time" job: twenty years with the com-
pany, Tuesdays and Thursdays = no pension), let the inter-
viewer know why, and follow-up with a letter to the 
management. 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Fringe benefits are rapidly expanding as a method of com-
pensation. As part of this strong trend, pension funds are now a 
major component of the nation's economy. In addition, the im-
portance of pensions as the major source of retirement income 
increases annually. As the major segment of the retired popula-
tion, older women should act to protect their interests in this 
critical national resource. 
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